This past summer, FBI Director James Comey requested that encryption methods used by corporations should be backdoored for the sake of national security. For those unfamiliar with these ideas, encryption is more or less what keeps people out of personal accounts without a password. A backdoor is any secret entrance for someone else. In this case, Comey wants personal documents to have a secret password that only the FBI (and associated organizations) can use.
Basically, they want a master password to personal information stored on the cloud (iCloud, Google Drive, Gmail, iMessage, Facebook). Many state organizations and at least one Republican candidate oppose personal encryption for national security reasons. Depending on your viewpoint, this request is either necessary for safety (particularly in the war on terrorism) or a blow to the citizens’ right to openly share information.
I should clarify that a lot of very helpful information is made available to law enforcement who acquire a subpoena in case a crime is actually committed. The problems I am discussing revolve around two other things. First, the FBI wants on-demand access to user data, regardless of the user being suspected of a crime. Second, Apple and other technology companies design systems whose content they could never access. This frustrates investigators but protects the sovereignty of the user’s communication.
The discussion focuses on the idea that the FBI wants organizations like Apple to design iMessage to give them permission to read the user’s messages as they are stored on the cloud. In spite of this, iMessages can still be read if the investigating party can gain physical access and the password to one of the user’s iOS or OS X devices. In short, the FBI wants access to the encrypted messages if they do not have enough evidence to convict without the actual text of the message and if they cannot gain control over the suspect’s Apple device that has access to the messages. With a subpoena and Apple’s cooperation, they can still determine things like whom users message, for how long, etc. They can only not read the message text. The FBI wants constant, full access to these texts, but this will benefit them only in rare cases and it will give them free access to user information.
One of the realities of the issue is that the current governing bodies have little interest in what citizens say in messages to their friends. They claim to want broad access to personal files for a more respectable reason: to identify patterns in the lives of those suspected of being a threat to the state. The goal is to protect U.S. citizens by identifying threats early. If one stolen child can be found, a prostitution ring be broken up or one terrorist attack be prevented by having unlimited access to this information, the program has succeeded.
Supporters of strong private encryption would argue that there is no way to know that the government will not abuse this power and we will essentially live in a surveillance state. Supporters of encryption backdoors would place an emphasis on the community and say that all personal information should be open to the government so that crimes can be prevented and tracked.
The idea of encryption backdoors is just one of many topics relating to freedom of information and information gathering. When I consider how much of our lives today are stored on our phones (bank PINs, health records, passwords to secure accounts), I think we should put much more thought into who owns information about us and what they do with it. We share too much information about ourselves to not care where it goes. I support unbreakable encryption and strongly encourage everyone to take issues relating to information freedom and privacy more seriously.
